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Optimal Iris Fuzzy Sketches
J. Bringer, H. Chabanne, G. Cohen, B. Kindarji and G. Ze´mor∗†‡
Abstract
Fuzzy sketches, introduced as a link between biometry and cryptography, are a way
of handling biometric data matching as an error correction issue. We focus here on
iris biometrics and look for the best error-correcting code in that respect. We show that
two-dimensional iterative min-sum decoding leads to results near the theoretical limits. In
particular, we experiment our techniques on the Iris Challenge Evaluation (ICE) database
and validate our findings.
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1 Introduction
Fuzzy Sketches have been introduced to handle differences occurring between two captures
of biometric data, viewed as errors over a codeword. Many papers give applications of this
technique for cryptographic purposes [1, 3, 2, 6, 7, 9, 17] but only a few investigate what
are the best codes for this decoding problem, e.g. [8], and how to find them. This issue is
addressed here.
1.1 Biometric matching and errors correction
Typically, a biometric-based recognition scheme consists of two phases: The enrollment phase
where a biometric template b is measured from a user U and then registered in a token or a
database. The second phase – the verification – captures a new biometric sample b′ from U
and compares it to the reference data via a matching function. According to some underlying
measure µ and some recognition threshold τ , b′ will be accepted as a biometric measure of U
if µ(b, b′) ≤ τ , else rejected. Mainly two kinds of errors are associated to this scheme: False
Reject (FR), when a matching user, i.e. a legitimate user, is rejected; False Acceptance (FA),
when a non-matching one, e.g. an impostor, is accepted.
Note that, when the threshold increases, the FR’s rate (FRR) decreases while the FA’s
rate (FAR) grows, and conversely.
Our methods will resort to information theory and coding. For more background, notation
and classical results, the reader is refered to [4] and [11] in these two fields respectively.
Assuming that the templates live in the Hamming space H = {0, 1}n equipped with the
Hamming distance dH, the main idea of fuzzy sketches, as introduced in [9], is to convert the
matching step into an error-correcting one. Let C be an error-correcting code included in H:
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• During the enrollment phase, one stores z = c⊕ b, where c is a random codeword in C,
• During the verification phase, one tries to correct the corrupted codeword z ⊕ b′ =
c⊕ (b⊕ b′). Note that when the Hamming distance dH(b, b
′) is small, recovering c from
c⊕ (b⊕ b′) is, in principle, possible.
The correction capacity of C may thus be equal to τ if we do not want to alter the FRR and
the FAR of the system. Unfortunately, the difference between two measures of one biometric
source can be very important, whereas the correction capacity of a code is structurally con-
strained. Moreover, the size of the code should not be too small, to prevent z from revealing
too much information about the template b.
1.2 Organization of this work
In a first part, we look for theoretical limits. We first modelize our problem with a binary
erasure-and-error channel. Given a database of biometric data, we then give a method for
finding an upper bound on the underlying error correction capacity.
In a second part, restricting ourselves to iris biometric data and illustrating our method
with iterative min-sum decoding of product codes, we provide parameters that put our per-
formances close to the theoretical limit.
2 Model
We consider two separate channels with a noise model based on the differences between any
two biometric templates.
• The first channel, called the matching channel, is generated by errors b⊕ b′ where b
and b′ come from the same user U .
• The second channel, the non-matching channel, is generated by errors where b and
b′ come from different biometric sources.
In a practical biometric system, the number of errors in the matching channel is on average
lower than in the non-matching channel.
Moreover, the templates are not restricted to a constant length. Indeed, when a sensor
captures biometric data, we want to keep the maximum quantity of information but it is
rarely possible to capture the same amount of data twice – for instance an iris may be
occulted by eyelids – hence the templates are of variable length. This variability can be
smoothed by forming a list of erasures, i.e. the list of coordinates where they occur. More
precisely, in coding theory, an erasure in the received message is an unknown symbol at a
known location. We thus have an erasure-and-error decoding problem on the matching
channel. Simultaneously, to keep the FAR low, we want a decoding success to be unlikely
on the non-matching channel : to this end we impose bounds on the correction capacity.
In the sequel, we deal with binary templates with at most N bits and assume, for the
theoretical analysis that follows, that the probabilities of error and erasure on each bit are
independent. Note that resorting to interleaving makes this hypothesis valid for all practical
purposes.
2.1 Theoretical limit
Our goal is to estimate the capacity, in the Shannon sense [15], of the matching channel when
we work with a code of a given dimension. Namely, we want to know the maximum number of
errors and erasures between two biometric measures that we can manage with fuzzy sketches
for this code.
Starting with a representative range of matching biometric data, the theorem below gives
an easy way to estimate the lowest achievable FRR. The idea is to check whether the best
possible code with the best generic decoding algorithm, i.e. a maximum-likelihood (ML)
decoding algorithm (which systematically outputs the most likely codeword), would succeed
in correcting the errors.
Theorem 1 Let k ∈ N∗, C be a binary code of length N and size 2k, and m a random
received message, from a random codeword of C, of length N with wn errors and we erasures.
Assume that C is an optimal code with respect to N and k, equipped with an ML decoder.
If wn
N−we
> θ then m is only decodable with a negligible probability, where θ is such that
the Hamming sphere of radius (N − we)θ in F
N−we
2 contains 2
N−we−k elements.
Proof. In the case of errors only (i.e. no erasures) with error-rate p := we/N , the canonical
second theorem of Shannon asserts that there are families of codes with (transmission) rate
R := k/n coming arbitrarily close to the channel capacity κ(p), decodable with ML-decoding
and a vanishing (in N) word error probability Pe.
In this case, κ(p) = 1− h(p), where h(p) is the (binary) entropy function (log’s are to the
base 2):
h(x) = −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x).
Furthermore, Pe displays a threshold phenomenon: for any rate arbitrarily close to, but
above capacity and any family of codes, Pe tends to 1 when N grows.
Equivalently, given R, there exists an error-rate threshold of
p = h−1(1−R),
h−1 being the inverse of the entropy function.
Back to the errors-and-erasures setting now. Our problem is to decode to the codeword
nearest to the received word on the nonerased positions.
Thus we are now faced with a punctured code with length N − we, size 2
k, transmission
rate R′ := k/(N − we) and required to sustain an error-rate p
′ := wn
N−we
.
By the previous discussion, if
p′ > θ := h−1(1−R′),
NO code and NO decoding procedure exist with a non-vanishing probability of success.
To conclude the proof, use the classical Stirling approximation for the size of a Hamming
sphere of radius αM in FM2 by 2
h(αM).
Practical implications of this theorem are illustrated in Table 1, Sec. 3.3.
3 Application
3.1 Description of the two-dimensional iterative min-sum decoding algo-
rithm
A binary linear error-correcting code C is a vector subspace of FN2 . The minimum distance
dmin of C is the smallest Hamming distance between two distinct codewords. When k is
the dimension of the subspace C, i.e. when it contains 2k codewords, C is denoted by
[N, k, dmin]2. The correction capacity t of C is the radius of the largest Hamming ball for
which, for any x ∈ FN2 , there is at most one codeword in the ball of radius t centered on x.
Clearly, t = ⌊(dmin − 1)/2⌋. An altered codeword with wn errors and we erasures can always
be corrected (by ML decoding) provided 2wn + we < dmin. However, if the code admits an
iterative decoding algorithm, practical results overtake this limitation.
We will work with product codes together with a specific iterative decoding algorithm
described below. A product code C = C1⊗C2 is constructed from two codes: C1[N1, k1, d1]2
and C2[N2, k2, d2]2. The codewords of C can be viewed as matrices of size N2×N1 whose rows
are codewords of C1 and columns are codewords of C2. This yields a [N1×N2, k1×k2, d1×d2]
code. When k1 and k2 are small enough for C1 and C2 to be decoded exhaustively a very
efficient iterative decoding algorithm is available, namely the min-sum decoding algorithm.
Min-sum decoding of LDPC codes was developed by Wiberg [18] as a particular instance of
message passing algorithms. In a somewhat different setting it was also proposed by Tanner
[16] for decoding generalized LDPC (Tanner) codes. The variant we will be using is close
to Tanner’s algorithm and is adapted to product codes. Min-sum is usually considered to
perform slightly worse than the more classical sum-product message passing algorithm on
the Gaussian, or binary-symmetric channels, but it is specially adapted to our case where
knowledge of the channel is poor, and the emphasis is simply to use the Hamming distance
as the appropriate basic cost function.
Let (xij) be a vector of {0, 1}
N1×N2 . The min-sum algorithm associates to every coordinate
xij a cost function κij for every iteration of the algorithm. The cost functions are defined on
the set {0, 1}. The initial cost function κ0ij is defined by κ
0
ij(x) = 0 if the received symbol on
coordinate (ij) is x and κ0ij(x) = 1 if the received symbol is 1− x.
A row iteration of the algorithm takes an input cost function κinij and produces an output
cost function κoutij . The algorithm first computes, for every row i and for every codeword
c = (c1 . . . cN1) of C1, the sum
κi(c) =
N1∑
j=1
κinij (cj)
which should be understood as the cost of putting codeword c on row i. The algorithm then
computes, for every i, j, κoutij defined as the following min, over the set of codewords of C1,
κoutij (x) = min
c∈C1,cj=x
κi(c).
This last quantity should be thought of as the minimum cost of putting the symbol x on
coordinate (ij) while satisfying the row constraint.
A column iteration of the algorithm is analogous to a row iteration, with simply the roles
of the row and column indexes reversed, and code C2 replacing code C1. Precisely we have
κj(c) =
N2∑
i=1
κinij (ci)
and
κoutij (x) = min
c∈C2,ci=x
κj(c).
The algorithm alternates row and column iterations as illustrated by Fig. 1. After a given
number of iterations (or before, if we find a codeword) it stops, and the value of every symbol
xij is put at xij = x if κ
out
ij (x) < κ
out
ij (1 − x). If κ
out
ij (x) = κ
out
ij (1 − x) then the value of xij
stays undecided (or erased).
The following theorem is fairly straightforward to prove and illustrates the power of min-
sum decoding.
Theorem 2 If the number of errors is less than d1d2/2, then two iterations of min-sum
decoding of the product code C1 ⊗ C2 recover the correct codeword.
3.2 Our setting
To validate our approach, we now present the results of experiments on a practical iris
database where we obtain correction performances close to the theoretical limit.
The database used for these experiments is the ICE (Phase I) database [10, 13] which
contained 2953 images from 244 different eyes. A 256-byte (2048 bits) iris template, together
with a 256-byte mask, is computed from each iris image using the algorithm reported in [5];
the mask filters out the unreliable bits, i.e. stores the erasures indices of the iris template. The
database is taken without any modification but two slight corrections: one eye is suppressed
due to a very low quality and the side of another eye has been switched from left to right.
Hence we keep 2952 images. Note that in the database, the number of images provided for
each eye is variable: so the number of intra-eye matching verifications between two iris codes
from the same eye is not constant. The same holds for the inter-eye matching between two
iris codes from different eyes. Among all the combinations, its gives a set of 29827 intra-eye
matching and about 4 million of inter-eye matching to check.
The classical way to compare two iris codes I1, I2 with masks M1,M2 is to compute the
relative Hamming distance
||(I1 ⊕ I2) ∩M1 ∩M2||
||M1 ∩M2||
for some rotations of the second template – to deal with the iris orientation’s variation – and
to keep the lowest score. It gives the following distributions of matching scores (cf. Fig 2)
where we see an overlap between the two curves. We also see that the number of errors to
handle in the matching channel is large (for instance at least 29% of errors for a FRR lower
than 5%). On this channel, an additional difficulty originates from the number of erasures
which varies from 512 to 1977.
3.3 Results on ICE database
We have experimented with the algorithm described in section 3.1 on this database with a
particular choice for the code. In fact, the product code is constructed to fit with an array of
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Figure 1: A row iteration followed by a column one
Figure 2: Inter-eyes and intra-eye distributions
2048 bits, by using Reed-Muller codes [12, 14] of order 1 which are known to have good weight
distributions. A binary Reed-Muller code of order 1 in m variables, abbreviated as RM(1,m),
is a [2m,m+ 1, 2m−1]2 code. We chose to combine the RM(1, 6) with the RM(1, 5), leading
to a product code of dimension 42 and codewords of length 64 × 32.
As the density of errors and erasures in an iris code can be very high in some regions, we
also added a randomly chosen interleaver to break this structure and increase the efficiency
of the decoding algorithm. In so doing, we succeeded in obtaining a FRR of about 5.62%
for a very small FAR (lower than 10−5). This is in fact very close to the FAR obtained in a
classical matching configuration for a similar FRR.
The overall size of the code could appear small from a cryptographic point of view, but
following the theoretical analysis of section 2.1, it is difficult to expect much more while
achieving a low FRR on this database. Indeed, from the distribution of errors and erasures
on the matching channel, we obtain by Theorem 1 the practical limits which are reported
in Table 1.
Table 1: Theoretical limits on ICE database
Code’s dimension Best theoretical FRR
42 2.49%
64 3.76%
80 4.87%
128 9.10%
Remark. In [8], the fuzzy sketch scheme is applied with a concatenated error-correcting
code combining a Hadamard code and a Reed-Solomon code. More precisely, the authors
use a Reed-Solomon code of length 32 over F27 (with a correction capacity tRS < 16) and a
Hadamard code of order 6 and length 64 (with a correction capacity tH = 15): a codeword of
2048 bits is in fact constructed as a set of 32 blocks of 64 bits where each block is a codeword
of the underlying Hadamard code. As explained in [8], the Hadamard code is introduced to
deal with the background errors and the Reed-Solomon code to deal with the bursts (e.g.
caused by eyelashes, reflections, . . .).
Note that in this scheme, the model is not exactly the same as ours, as the masks are not
taken into account. Moreover, the quality of the database used in [8] is better than for the
ICE database. Actually, [8] reports very good results on their experiments with a database
of 700 images, but the codes do not seem appropriate to our case as our experiment on the
ICE database gave a too large rate of FR (e.g. 10% of FR with 0.80% of FA), even for the
smallest possible dimension of the Reed-Solomon code when tRS = 15.
4 Conclusion
We derived explicit upper bounds on the correction capacity of Fuzzy Sketches on iris-based
biometrics. We then showed how the two-dimensional iterative min-sum decoding algorithm
achieves correction performance close to the optimal decoding rate. Our results were validated
on a typical iris database.
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